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Developmental Changes in Children’s
Processing of Redundant Modifiers
in Definite Object Descriptions
Ruud Koolen*, Emiel Krahmer and Marc Swerts
Tilburg Center for Cognition and Communication, Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands
This paper investigates developmental changes in children’s processing of redundant
information in definite object descriptions. In two experiments, children of two age
groups (6 or 7, and 9 or 10 years old) were presented with pictures of sweets. In the
first experiment (pairwise comparison), two identical sweets were shown, and one of
these was described with a redundant modifier. After the description, the children had to
indicate the sweet they preferred most in a forced-choice task. In the second experiment
(graded rating), only one sweet was shown, which was described with a redundant color
modifier in half of the cases (e.g., “the blue sweet”) and in the other half of the cases
simply as “the sweet.” This time, the children were asked to indicate on a 5-point rating
scale to what extent they liked the sweets. In both experiments, the results showed
that the younger children had a preference for the sweets described with redundant
information, while redundant information did not have an effect on the preferences for
the older children. These results imply that children are learning to distinguish between
situations in which redundant information carries an implicature and situations in which
this is not the case.
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INTRODUCTION
In referential communication, speakers often have communicative intentions that go beyond the
identification of a target referent. For example, imagine a mother producing the following utterance
to her young son: “Be careful with the big wine gum!”, in a setting where there is only one wine
gum present. Obviously, by producing this utterance, the mother has the intention to communicate
to her son that he has to be careful with the wine gum in order to prevent him from choking. In
doing this, she uses two cues: firstly, she explicitly uses the imperative verb phrase ‘be careful,’ and
secondly, there is an implicit cue, being the adjective ‘big.’ In the literal sense, this adjective is not
necessary for unique identification of the wine gum, so that it can be considered to be redundant:
there is no other wine gum at play, and the child will probably be able to estimate the size of the
wine gum himself. Thus, at first sight, a description such as “the big wine gum” is overspecified in
this example context.
Of course, in this particular situation, emphasizing the big size of the wine gum is
driven by the mother’s communicative intentions: it will (hopefully) cause the child to reason
that his mother includes this information to warn him against the hazards of choking
on large objects. Following Grice (1975), this kind of implicit reasoning is triggered by a
conversational implicature, resulting from a violation of the Gricean Maxim of Quantity. This
maxim states that a contribution to a dialog should be as informative as required, but not
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more informative. In our example, the mother’s use of the
adjective ‘big’ appears to violate the Maxim of Quantity, thereby
triggering the implicit reasoning sketched above.
Redundant modifiers do not always evoke a specific
implicature. Many previous studies have shown that speakers
might also overspecify routinely, referring, say, to a single wine
gum as “the red wine gum” because color is a salient attribute that
attracts attention (Pechmann, 1989). The redundant modifier
‘red’ would probably not trigger a conversational implicature
here, because listeners are generally able to distinguish redundant
modifiers that yield extra connotations from redundant modifiers
that do not serve such a pragmatic purpose. Actually, assigning
special status to the redundant information in this example
would be inconsistent with what the speaker intended to
communicate.
While adult language users are generally well able to
monitor each other’s implicit communicative intentions (e.g.,
Levinson, 2000), this might be different for children: younger
children in particular are still learning to understand the
implications of redundant information (Siegal and Surian,
2004), and to distinguish between situations in which speakers
aim to elicit an implicature and situations where this is not
the case. In this paper, we therefore study how children
comprehend redundant information that does not serve any
specific goal, such as is the case with ‘red’ in the example
given above. Are children able to derive that the modifier
is purely redundant? Or do they reason that the object’s
color is relevant somehow? And how do children develop in
this respect? We answer these questions by presenting two
comprehension studies, where we used forced-choice tasks
(Experiment 1) and graded rating scales (Experiment 2) to study
the effect of redundant information on children’s preferences for
sweets.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Children start referring to physical objects in the world around
them when they are around 12 months old, using first words
(Fenson et al., 1994) and pointing gestures (Tomasello et al.,
2007). Between the age of 2 and 4, more complex references are
uttered, but these are often underspecified, and do not contain
enough information to identify the target (Matthews et al., 2007,
2012). Later, around the age of 5, children become aware of the
information they share with their listener (Nadig and Sedivy,
2002). Children start including redundant information regularly
roughly from the age of 7 (Ford and Olson, 1975; Whitehurst,
1976), and they continue to do so as adults (e.g., Pechmann, 1989;
Arts, 2004; Tarenskeen et al., 2015; Rubio-Fernández, 2016).
So why do adult speakers overspecify so often? As we have
seen in the example with the mother and the wine gum, one
reason is to evoke an implicature. However, one can also think
of situations in which the redundant information does not
serve a specific communicative purpose. In those cases, speakers
seem to overspecify routinely, for speaker-internal reasons.
Previous work in this direction has for example revealed that
overspecification is triggered by the presence of visual clutter
(Koolen et al., 2016), the incremental nature of speech production
(Pechmann, 1989), and the amount of visual variation in the
scene (e.g., Clarke et al., 2013; Koolen et al., 2013). In these cases,
speakers do not necessarily take the listener perspective into
account, but include redundant attributes that are perceptually
salient and grab their attention.
The observation that overspecification is not always intended
to evoke a specific implicature has at least one important
implication: listeners must distinguish between situations
where the redundant modifier communicates implicit extra
information, and situations where this is not the case. Are they
always able to do so in a successful way?
The Cooperative Principle
For adult listeners, it can be argued that they have no
difficulty in comprehending overspecified referring expressions.
According to Grice’s (1975) Cooperative Principle, this is
because experienced speakers and listeners tend to co-operate
when they are in a conversation (Brennan and Clark, 1996).
To characterize the expectations of people in a conversation,
Grice introduced four maxims, which hold that speakers
should not say less or more than is required (Maxim of
Quantity), that they should tell the truth and avoid unfounded
statements (Maxim of Quality), that their contribution should
be relevant (Maxim of Relation), and that they should
avoid obscurity and ambiguity (Maxim of Manner). These
maxims have important implications for listeners (Grice, 1989),
who might fail to understand the speakers’ communicative
intention if one of the maxims is violated. In that case, the
listener may draw a false implicature, or even no implicature
at all.
Given that adult speakers are generally cooperative, it is
plausible to assume that speakers aim to prevent their listeners
from deriving false implicatures, and that they thus make
sure that their listeners are able to assess the relevance of
the information that they are provided with. Experimental
findings from Engelhardt et al. (2006) are compatible with this
assumption: although their study is not necessarily informative
about speakers’ aims, it shows that adult listeners who are asked
to judge the quality of instructions do not rate overspecified
referring expressions lower than minimally specified ones.
One explanation for this result could be that adult listeners
are expected to have much linguistic experience (Hendriks,
2016), which makes them better able to judge whether a
redundant modifier carries implicit meaning or not. However,
for child listeners, the situation may be different: they might not
understand why, when and how the conversational maxims are
violated, and thus fail to understand a speaker’s communicative
intentions (Siegal and Surian, 2004). In other words, children are
expected to have a higher chance of deriving false implicatures –
or no implicature at all – than adults.
In the next section, we discuss previous literature on children’s
development in the derivation of two kinds of conversational
implicatures related to Grice’s Maxim of Quantity. We report on
existing research on how children of different age groups process
redundant information during reference resolution, and during
the comprehension of scalar implicatures.
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Children’s Ability to Master Quantity
Implicatures
It is traditionally assumed that until the age of 7 or 8, children
are not good at evaluating the communicative content of the
expressions that they are presented with. Some early studies
(e.g., Ackermann, 1981; Bonitatibus et al., 1988; Ackermann
et al., 1990) argue that young children generally find it hard
to distinguish between ambiguous and informative descriptions
when selecting a target, in the sense that they have difficulty
indicating whether their selected object is the “right one,” the
one the speaker “meant,” or the one the speaker “could have
meant.” Ackermann et al. (1990) explain this by claiming that
young children often fail to derive the speaker’s communicative
intentions from an expression, and relate it to the common
ground that is shared between the speaker and the listener:
children under the age of 8 find it difficult to infer relevant
information from shared knowledge.
Some studies directly measure the impact of redundant
attributes on child listeners. These studies investigate
overspecification in the light of identification: to what extent
do redundant attributes help or inhibit a child to select a
target referent? For example, Sonnenschein (1982) found that
redundant information facilitated target identification for
9-year-old children, but not for their 5-year-old counterparts.
Sonnenschein explained these results by arguing that the
memory capacity of younger children is not sufficient to process
redundant modifiers. In a similar vein, Davies and Katsos (2010)
applied a binary judgment task and magnitude estimation
ratings to investigate whether 5-year-olds and adults perceived
minimally specified object descriptions as more natural than
overspecified ones. The results for the magnitude estimation task
(but not for the binary task) revealed that the children indeed
rated the overspecified descriptions lower than the minimally
specified ones, which implies that children are already sensitive
to violations of the Maxim of Quantity from the age of 5.
Similar results were found for the adults, with lower ratings for
overspecified descriptions rather than minimally specified ones.
Note that this pattern for the adult participants is inconsistent
with the pattern reported by Engelhardt et al. (2006), see
Davies and Katsos (2013), and Engelhardt (2013) for a detailed
discussion of this inconsistency.
Also Krahmer et al. (2013) used graded ratings to study
the impact of redundant modifiers on children of different age
groups. In this study, 6- and 9-year-old children were asked to
estimate the size of a target referent (a toy) that was either referred
to with a minimally specified description (e.g., the football) or an
overspecified one, using a size attribute (e.g., the large football).
The results again showed an effect of age group: the young
children made larger size estimates than the older ones in the
overspecification condition, but not in the minimal condition.
According to Krahmer et al. (2013), these results suggest that 9-
year-old children are less sensitive to redundant size modifiers
than their 6-year-old counterparts.
Besides quantity implicatures in the context of reference
resolution, children must also learn to derive scalar implicatures.
Such implicatures follow from sentences in which scalar
modifiers are used. For example, the sentence “Some toys
are green” elicits the implicature that at least two toys are
green, but not all. The traditional view on the derivation of
scalar implicatures is that children are not able to comprehend
scalar quantifiers at adult-like level until they are 7 years old
(Noveck and Reboul, 2009). However, recently, this view has
been nuanced: for example, children’s ability to master scalar
implicatures depends on the type of quantifying term that they
have to comprehend (Musolino, 2004; Geurts et al., 2010), and,
more important for the current study, on the experimental task
that they are faced with (Katsos and Bishop, 2011).
To investigate the impact of task, Katsos and Bishop (2011)
presented 5-year-old children with videos in which a protagonist
performed some course of action with a number of objects
(e.g., a mouse picks up five carrots, but leaves five pumpkins
unattended). After every video, the children had to judge
(Experiment 1) or reward (Experiment 2) a statement. In half
of the stimuli, the statements contained the scalar modifier
‘some,’ causing them to be pragmatically underinformative in
the context of the performed action (e.g., “the mouse moves
some of the carrots”). The other half of the stimuli contained
statements that were fully informative. In the first experiment,
Katsos and Bishop (2011) used a binary judgment task to let the
children indicate whether the statements were right or wrong.
They found that the participants rejected underinformative scalar
expressions in only 26% of the cases, suggesting that children
are not able to derive scalar implicatures related to ‘some’ at
the age of 5. However, when the authors used three-point Likert
scales to reward the statements (which they did in their second
experiment), the underinformative statements were rated lower
than fully informative ones. Katsos and Bishop (2011) explain
these results by suggesting that the children’s poor performance
in the first experiment was due to the binary task, and that
children are already sensitive to violations of the Gricean maxims
at the age of 5.
THE CURRENT STUDY
In the previous sections, we have described how children
of different ages develop their ability to successfully derive
implicatures related to the Maxim of Quantity (Grice, 1975). The
picture that emerges from the literature raises two interesting
observations. Firstly, some previous work has shown that
children are not sensitive to violations of the Maxim of Quantity
at the age of 5 (e.g., Sonnenschein, 1982; Noveck and Reboul,
2009; Krahmer et al., 2013), while other work has shown that
they are (e.g., Davies and Katsos, 2010; Katsos and Bishop,
2011). Secondly, the experimental task that is used affects the
children’s performance to a large extent, in such a way that it
has been shown that 5-year-olds do not reject redundant (Davies
and Katsos, 2010) or underspecified (Katsos and Bishop, 2011)
descriptions in a binary judgment task, but that they do so when
graded rating scales are used.
The current study aims to gain further insight in these two
issues by addressing the question how children develop their
ability to process overspecified descriptions in situations where
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the speaker includes a redundant attribute in a description,
but not with the purpose to elicit a specific implicature. This
is an important question, since speakers may overspecify for
various reasons. On the one hand, speakers may overspecify
“on purpose” to elicit a more traditional Gricean implicature.
This is what happens in the example where a mother mentions
the size of a sweet to warn her child. On the other hand, as
noted earlier, redundant attributes can also be used routinely:
speakers may, for example, use redundant attributes that
are visually salient and grab their attention, such as color
(e.g., Pechmann, 1989; Koolen et al., 2013). For children, the
question is whether they are able to monitor the speaker’s
communicative intentions: at some point in development,
they must learn to decide when a redundant attribute is
relevant in a given communicative context, and when it is
not.
In our experiments, we present children with overspecified
descriptions of sweets, and test to what extent the redundant
information determines their preferences for the sweets. We
compare the performance of children of two age groups (6- and
7-year-olds, and 9- and 10-year-olds), and hypothesize that the
younger children are affected by the redundant information in
their preferences for sweets, but that the older children are not.
Our reasoning is that older children have learned to distinguish
between situations in which speakers aim to elicit an implicature
and situations in which this is not the case, while younger
children might overgeneralize by reasoning that redundant
information is always used to trigger an implicature. In the case
of overgeneralization (which is a well-known phenomenon in
child language acquisition; Tomasello, 2003), a child will wonder
about the speaker’s intention with including the redundant
attribute. However, given that there is none, the child may
reason that the speaker intends to draw special attention to the
sweet, for example to communicate that it should be preferred
and that it is the right choice in the current situation. One
alternative hypothesis would be that any effect of redundant
information is due solely to attentional asymmetries, and to
children’s capacities to switch attention between different objects.
In the general discussion, we elaborate further on the role of
attention.
Because experimental task might affect children’s performance
(Davies and Katsos, 2010; Katsos and Bishop, 2011), we present
the results of two experiments in which we test the above
hypothesis: one using a binary forced-choice task and one using
5-point rating scales. We manipulate color and shape modifiers
as redundant information.
EXPERIMENT 1: A FORCED-CHOICE
TASK
In our first experiment, we presented children of two age groups
with pictures of two sweets. In all critical trials, these two sweets
were identical, and one of them was referred to with a redundant
color or shape modifier. In a forced-choice task, the children were
asked to indicate which of the two sweets they preferred, based on
the descriptions they had heard.
Method
Participants
Participants were 49 children of two age groups. The sample of
younger children consisted of 22 children (10 males, 12 females)
with a mean age of 6;7 years (ranging between 6;0 and 7;3). The
sample of older children consisted of 27 children (12 males, 15
females) with a mean age of 9;8 years (ranging between 9;2 and
10;2). All children were recruited at the same primary school,
and had Dutch as their primary language. They had been given
permission to participate by their parents via a signed consent
form.
Materials
The materials consisted of pictures of two sweets. These two
sweets were placed next to each other. In the critical trials, the
two sweets were of the same kind and color (see the left picture
in Figure 1), which meant that the participating children had no
reason to have an a priori preference for one of the two.
Pre-recorded descriptions of the two sweets were played while
the pictures were shown to the children. In every trial, one of
the sweets (either the left or the right one) was referred to with
a redundant modifier; the other sweet was simply referred to as
“this sweet.” The spoken descriptions were presented as questions
that had the following basic structures, depending on which sweet
was referred to with a modifier: “Would you like this (. . .) sweet
or this sweet?” or “Would you like this sweet or this (. . .) sweet?”
First, a picture of the two sweets was shown (see the left picture of
Figure 1), during which the first part of the question was played:
“Would you like. . .”. After that, the description of the first (left)
sweet was played. During this description, the corresponding
sweet was highlighted with a red arrow (see the middle picture of
Figure 1). Once the left sweet had been described, a description
of the right sweet followed, again highlighted with a red arrow
(see the right picture of Figure 1). After the two descriptions, the
child had to indicate which sweet he or she preferred. The pre-
recorded descriptions were produced by a female voice with a
FIGURE 1 | An example of a critical trial. The trial started and ended with the left picture. In between, the middle and right pictures were presented (highlighting
the left and right sweet).
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natural intonation, to avoid overly contrastive accents that would
put (too) much emphasis on the redundant modifier. Note that
the combination of the arrow with the basic description “this
sweet” was always sufficient to unambiguously identify the sweet,
i.e., the inclusion of a modifier always resulted in an overspecified
description.
There were six critical trials in which the redundant modifier
provided perceptual information about one of the two sweets.
In four critical trials, information about the color of the sweets
was used, while shape information was provided in another
two critical trials. For example, in the critical trial depicted in
Figure 1, this led to the following question: “Would you like this
sweet or this yellow sweet?” Based on the descriptions, the children
were asked to indicate which sweet they preferred. Whether the
left or right sweet was described with a redundant modifier was
counterbalanced over trials.
We performed a pre-test in order to make sure that the
children were aware that the two sweets in the pictures used for
the critical trials looked in fact identical. To do this, we presented
six pictures of two identical looking sweets (the same as the ones
used in our experiment) and six pictures of two different sweets
(randomly selected from the fillers) to 20 children (ten from
each age group). None of these children had participated in the
main experiment. For each picture, we asked the children the
following question: “Do these two sweets taste the same?” For the
pictures of identical sweets, the results showed that the children
expected the two sweets to taste identical in 100% of the cases,
and this percentage decreased to 2% for the pictures of different
sweets. We conclude from this pre-test that all information that
was provided in speech about the sweets in the critical trials
could be considered redundant. Hence, if a child preferred the
redundantly described sweet, the redundant modifier arguably
guided the choice for this sweet.
Sixty-six trials were included as fillers, the majority of which
(48) consisted of pictures of two different kinds of sweets, both
described with various kinds of information (a combination of
perceptual and affective information). A small minority of the
fillers (18) consisted of pictures of two similar sweets. In the
majority of these trials, one of the two sweets was described
with affective information (such as ‘delicious’ or ‘disgusting’). The
remaining six fillers served as a baseline, allowing us to check
whether the children were biased in favor of either the left or the
right sweet. In these cases, neither of the two sweets was described
with a modifier, and the following question was asked: “Would
you like this sweet or this sweet?” The results showed that the
children did not have a bias for left or right: the younger children
chose the left sweet in 50% of the baseline trials, while the older
ones did this in 51.8% of the cases. These proportions did not
differ significantly from chance level (i.e., 50%), as revealed by
one-sample t-tests that were applied to the participants’ mean
scores on the six baseline trials [young children: t(21) = 0.00,
ns; older children: t(26) = 0.035, ns]. Based on these results, we
ignore order of presentation in the analyses of the data.
Procedure
The procedure was identical for the children in both age groups.
The experiment had a running time of approximately 15 min,
and was individually performed in a quiet room inside a school
building. The experiment was conducted in Dutch. We created
one block of 72 trials in a fixed random order (this was presented
to one half of the participants), and a second block containing
the same trials in reverse order (which was presented to the other
half of the participants). Our analyses did not show a significant
difference between these two groups, meaning that there was no
evidence of an effect of block on children’s choices for sweets.
After a child had entered the experimental room, he or she
was asked to take place in front of a computer screen. The
experimenter was seated next to the child for the duration of
the experiment. The instructions (which were provided orally
by the experimenter) explained that the children first had to
listen carefully to the pre-recorded descriptions that were given
about the two sweets, and that they then had to indicate which
of the two sweets they preferred. They could either do this by
pointing at the sweet of choice on the screen, or by telling the
experimenter which choice they had made. It was emphasized
that the children had to base their choices on the descriptions
that were provided about the sweets. Each time a child had
completed a trial, the experimenter marked his or her choice on
an answering form. In each trial, the children had 4 seconds to
indicate which sweet they preferred, but they were given more
time in case this was necessary. The experimental procedure
started with three practice trials to acquaint the children with the
procedure. After the completion of the experiment, the children
confirmed that they had understood the experimental task. When
explicitly asked, none of the children indicated to have been aware
of the actual goal of the study.
Design and Statistical Analysis
The experiment had a between-participants design with age
group (levels: young, old) as the independent variable, and the
proportion of choices for the redundantly described sweet as the
dependent variable. The younger children in the sample were 6 or
7 years old, and the older children were 9 or 10 years old. In order
to test for significant differences between the two age groups, we
performed a one-way ANOVA. In order to control for departures
of normality, we also ran the ANOVA on arcsin transformed
proportions. Because the results for this additional analysis
showed exactly the same picture as those for the untransformed
data, we stick to the untransformed data in our results section.
We applied one-sample t-tests on the participants’ proportions
to see whether these were significantly different from chance level
(i.e., 50%) in either of the two age groups.
Results and Interim Discussion
Figure 2 depicts the proportion of choices for the sweets that were
described with redundant information as a function of the two
different age groups.
Figure 2 shows a clear difference between the younger
and older children in terms of the proportion of choices for
the sweets that were described with a redundant modifier. As
reflected in an effect of age group [F(1,47) = 35.22, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.43], the young children were far more sensitive to
these redundant modifiers. More specifically, we found that the
young children were more likely to choose the sweet that was
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 December 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1900
fpsyg-07-01900 December 1, 2016 Time: 17:16 # 6
Koolen et al. Children’s Processing of Redundant Modifiers
FIGURE 2 | The proportion of choices for the redundantly described
sweets as a function of age group.
described with redundant information (M = 0.79, SD = 0.03),
and this proportion was significantly higher than 50% chance
level: t(21) = 9.80, p < 0.001. For the older children, however,
the results showed a different pattern, in the sense that they only
chose the redundantly described sweet in around half of the cases
(M = 0.51, SD = 0.03). This proportion was not significantly
different from 50% chance level: t(26)= 0.36, ns.
The above results indicate that while younger children are
guided in their choices by redundant modifiers, older children are
not. For the older children, we found that they were not sensitive
to redundant modifiers related to the color or shape of the sweets:
in the cases where they had to choose between for example “the
green sweet” and “the sweet”, they scored at chance level. This was
not the case for the younger children, who chose the redundantly
described sweet in almost 80% of the cases.
As we have seen in the introduction section, earlier work has
emphasized the role of the experimental task if one wants to study
children’s ability to successfully derive quantity implicatures.
Particularly, in some situations, 5-year-olds have been shown to
perform better when magnitude estimation scales rather than
binary judgment tasks are used (e.g., Davies and Katsos, 2010;
Katsos and Bishop, 2011). Therefore, in the next experiment,
we replicate our first experiment with pictures of single sweets.
Instead of binary judgments, we use 5-point rating scales to
measure to what extent children are affected by redundant
information in their ratings. The use of graded rating scales has
the additional advantage that the task becomes somewhat more
natural, since the children no longer have to choose between two
identical looking sweets (see below).
EXPERIMENT 2: GRADED RATING
SCALES
Method
Participants
Participants were 60 children in roughly the same age groups
as those used in the first experiment. The sample of younger
FIGURE 3 | Example of a critical trial in the second experiment.
A pre-recorded description of the sweet was played while a trial was shown.
children consisted of 30 children (15 males, 15 females) with a
mean age of 7;1 year (ranging between 6;6 and 8;3). The sample
of older children consisted of 30 children as well (17 males, 13
females) with a mean age of 10;2 years (ranging between 8;7
and 11;5). The children had not participated in the previous
experiment, had Dutch as their primary language, and had
been given permission to participate by their parents via signed
consent.
Materials
Experiment 2 was a partial replication of Experiment 1, in the
sense that we again measured children’s preferences for sweets,
but this time only one sweet was depicted in every trial (see
Figure 3). In all trials, a pre-recorded description of this sweet
was played while it was shown. The descriptions were produced
by a male voice using a natural intonation, again avoiding (too)
prominent accents. Since there was only one sweet in every
picture, the basic description “The sweet” was always sufficient
for unambiguous identification, causing any modifier to be
redundant.
This second experiment had 12 critical trials in two conditions.
In the unmodified condition (represented by six trials), the
depicted sweet was simply described as “The sweet”. The other
six critical trials formed the overspecification condition. As in
Experiment 1, the sweets in this condition were described using
perceptual information, but now only color modifiers were used.
For example, in Figure 3, this would lead to a description such
as “The blue sweet.” In order to avoid that a priori preferences for
sweets would interfere with our findings, the same six pictures of
sweets were used in both conditions.
The crucial difference between Experiments 1 and 2 was
related to the way in which the children marked their preferences
for sweets in every trial: while a forced-choice task was used
in the first experiment, we now used 5-point graded rating
scales. This went as follows: after having been presented with
a picture of a sweet and having listened to the corresponding
description, the children were asked to indicate to what extent
they liked the sweet. This was done via a pre-recorded question
(“How much do you like this sweet?”), which was played
automatically after the description of a sweet, and was the
same for all trials. The children could indicate the extent
to which they liked the sweet by pointing at one of the
cardboard smiley faces that were lying in front of them. Such
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FIGURE 4 | The cardboard smiley faces representing the 5-point rating scale.
facial representations of graded rating scales are commonly
used in studies with children (e.g., Lockl and Schneider, 2002;
Visser et al., 2014). As Figure 4 shows, the smiley faces
represented five categories, ranging from “not at all” to “very
much.”
As fillers, we used pictures of sweets and other kinds of food
(such as bananas and eggs). As in the critical trials, always one
item was depicted per trial. These items could be described by
means of an affective modifier (such as delicious or disgusting),
or via a combination of affective and perceptual information.
Thirty-six fillers were included, resulting in a total of 48 trials for
the entire experiment.
Procedure
The procedure of the current experiment was essentially similar
to the one followed in the first experiment, and was the same
for the children in the two age groups. The experiment was
conducted in a quiet room in a school building, and had an
average running time of approximately 10 min. The language of
the study was Dutch. The trials were presented in a fixed random
order, which was the same for all children in both age groups.
The children were seated in front of a computer screen
depicting the trials, with the experimenter seated next to the child
for the course of the entire experiment. As in the first experiment,
the instructions were provided orally, and it was explained that
the children had to listen carefully to the sweet descriptions.
Moreover, the 5-point graded rating scale was introduced, and
the children were explicitly asked to base their choices on the
pre-recorded descriptions of the sweets. Two practice trials were
included to acquaint the children with the rating scale.
After every trial, the experimenter marked which of the five
smiley faces the child had pointed at on an answering form. Like
in the previous experiment, the children had 4 seconds to make
their choice, but more time was given if necessary. Afterward, the
children confirmed that they had understood the experimental
task. Most of them indicated that they thought that the task was
about food in general.
Design and Statistical Analysis
The experiment had one between-participants variable (age –
levels: young and old), and one within-participants variable
(condition – levels: unmodified and overspecified). The
dependent variable was the extent to which the children
liked the sweets, with scores ranging from 1 to 5. The younger
children in the sample were again 6 or 7 years old, and the
older ones were again 9 or 10 years old. We performed a mixed
ANOVA to test for significance. The analysis was done at the
level of the individual trials.
Results and Interim Discussion
Figure 5 depicts the average scores of the younger and older
children as a function of the two conditions.
Firstly, the results revealed a main effect of age [F(1,58) = 6.07,
p < 0.02, η2 = 0.10], showing that the younger children
(M = 4.08, SD = 0.13) generally liked the sweets better than
the older children (M = 3.64, SD = 0.13). Furthermore, there
was a main effect of condition [F(1,58) = 3.98, p = 0.05,
η2 = 0.06], indicating that the scores in the trials where a
sweet was described with redundant information (M = 3.91,
SD = 0.09) were significantly higher than the scores in the
unmodified condition (M = 3.81, SD = 0.09). As Figure 5
suggests, we also found a significant interaction between age and
condition [F(1,58) = 6.00, p < 0.02, η2 = 0.09], showing that the
effect of condition was due to the performance of the younger
children: while the older children gave practically equal scores
to the sweets in the unmodified (M = 3.63, SD = 0.13) and the
overspecification (M = 3.65, SD = 0.13) conditions, the younger
ones liked a sweet better when it was described with a perceptual
modifier (M = 4.19, SD= 0.13) than when no modifier was used
(M = 3.97, SD= 0.13).
FIGURE 5 | The average scores of the children in the two age groups,
as a function of the unmodified and the overspecification conditions.
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FIGURE 6 | Speaker variation in the two age groups: the difference in the scores for the unmodified and the overspecification conditions (y-axis) as a
function of the individual children in the two age groups (x-axis). A positive value indicates that a child rated the overspecified descriptions higher than the
minimal ones.
The above interaction between age group and condition
follows a similar pattern as compared to the results of the first
experiment (in which we also found differences between the
unmodified condition and the overspecification condition for
the younger children, but not for the older ones). However, this
time, the effect sizes that we measured were generally smaller.
Therefore, we focused on the individual scores for all participants,
to see whether the effects of redundancy were consistent across
participants in either of the age groups. In doing so, for each
child we calculated the difference between the scores in the
overspecification condition and the unmodified condition. For
example, if a child scored 4.15 on average in the overspecification
condition and 3.95 on average in the unmodified condition, the
individual score for this child was 0.20. Figure 6 depicts the
individual scores for all children that took part in this second
experiment.
As can be seen in Figure 6, the number of children who
scored zero (7 younger children; 8 older children) or below zero
(8 younger children; 9 older children) was practically equal for
the two age groups, which shows that the differences between
conditions that we observed are not consistent across all children
in the two age groups. Hence, only eight children in the younger
group scored 0.5 or higher, which is in line with the fact that the
effect sizes in this second experiment were rather small. Finally,
we observe that the amount of individual variation between
children was greater in the younger group than in the older group.
We come back to this issue of individual variation in the Section
“General Discussion.”
The results of the second experiment again indicate that 6- and
7-year-old children are guided in their preferences by redundant
information to a larger extent than 9 and 10-year-old children. In
particular, the younger children liked a sweet significantly better
if it was described with a (redundant) color attribute than in
the unmodified case, while the scores of the older children were
practically identical in both conditions. Although a different task
was used, these results show the same pattern as those found in
the first experiment. However, note that the effect sizes that were
measured here were generally smaller.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of the two experiments presented in this paper
revealed that 6- and 7-year-old children are influenced by
redundant color and shape modifiers in their preferences for
sweets, while 9- and 10-year-old children in a similar setting
generally ignore such information. The observed age differences
are consistent across two experimental tasks: a binary forced-
choice task (Experiment 1), and a task that used 5-point graded
rating scales (Experiment 2). Our results are in line with our
hypothesis, and suggest that younger children process redundant
information in a different way than older children. How can we
explain this difference?
To answer this question, we would like to take the reasoning
behind our hypothesis as a starting point. Naturally, we
distinguished between different reasons why speakers may
overspecify: sometimes, they include a redundant modifier on
purpose in order to elicit a specific implicature, but they may
also use redundant information routinely, for example because
certain target attributes attract their attention (e.g., Pechmann,
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1989; Krahmer et al., 2013). We expected to find that the older
children in our sample would be able to distinguish between
these two scenarios, while the younger children would not be
able to do so, or at least not to the same extent. This expectation
was grounded in previous literature on language acquisition,
which shows that children do not start to overspecify their own
object descriptions regularly until they are 7 years old (Ford
and Olson, 1975; Whitehurst, 1976), and that the age of 7 also
marks the point from which they should be able to comprehend
scalar quantifiers at adult-like level (Noveck and Reboul, 2009).
In addition, previous research showed that 5-to-6-year-olds have
a hard time comprehending overspecified descriptions, while 9-
year-olds and adults do not have these problems (Sonnenschein,
1982; Krahmer et al., 2013). According to Siegal and Surian
(2004), such differences between age groups can be attributed to
pragmatic development: children must simply learn to interpret
the pragmatic implications of the redundant information that is
provided to them in a conversation.
Following Siegal and Surian’s (2004) argumentation,
pragmatic development might also explain the age differences
observed in the current paper: after all, the children in our
experiments had to judge whether the redundant modifiers
they were presented with were relevant in the context. Hence, if
pragmatic development indeed explains our findings, then what
is the nature of this development in Gricean terms? Based on
the differences between the age groups, one may argue that older
children have learned to distinguish between the various reasons
why speakers may overspecify their object descriptions, and that
redundant information does not necessarily carry an implicature.
For example, in Experiment 1, our pre-test revealed that both the
younger and older children considered the two sweets they were
presented with to be similar. However, only the older children
showed awareness that the color and shape information was
not intended to evoke a specific implicature: their preference to
choose redundantly described sweets was not different from 50%
chance level.
For the young children, the situation was different: they
showed a strong preference for sweets described with a
redundant modifier (in Experiment 1), and also rated these
sweets higher than the sweets that came with a minimal
description (in Experiment 2). These results suggest that young
children must still learn that violations of the Maxim of
Quantity are only sometimes intended to elicit an implicature.
Instead, children may overgeneralize, reasoning that redundant
modifiers are always used to evoke a specific implicature.
Such overgeneralization processes are ubiquitous in language
acquisition. For example, the pre-emption hypothesis (Goldberg,
1995) states that there is a one–one correspondence between
linguistic forms and meanings: once a child has learned a form
for expressing a given meaning, other linguistic forms with the
same meaning are discarded, unless other language input offers
positive evidence for a second form. This prediction is in line
with the entrenchment hypothesis (Braine and Brooks, 1995),
which states that the meaning with the greatest overall frequency
for a certain linguistic form blocks the assignment of a ‘new’
meaning. These kinds of usage-based processes have for example
been found to occur when children learn to use certain adjectives
(Boyd and Goldberg, 2011), and predict that relatively frequently
used expressions might become highly predictable (Tomasello,
2003).
Applied to our findings, one model of pragmatic development
based on usage-based processes may be that in order to learn that
not all modification is intended to evoke a specific implicature,
children need to be exposed to a critical mass of redundant
modifiers, uttered with diverse communicative intentions. This
way, due to increasing linguistic experience, they learn when to
draw an implicature, but also to recognize the situations in which
they should not do so. This line of reasoning may in particular
be true for absolute modifiers such as color, since these are very
frequently used as a result of speaker-internal, saliency-based
processes (e.g., Pechmann, 1989; Koolen et al., 2013), without the
intention to evoke a specific implicature.
What meaning did the younger children assign to the
redundant modifiers that they were presented with, if they indeed
overgeneralized and assumed that the overspecified descriptions
were intended to elicit an implicature? We believe that the
children first wondered (either implicitly or explicitly) about the
implicit intentions of the speaker to use a redundant modifier.
However, given that there were no clear underlying intentions,
the children might have reasoned that the speaker simply
intended to draw special attention to one sweet, to communicate
that the sweet should be preferred and that it was the right choice
in the communicative context. The reason why a redundant
modifier made a sweet more attractive, and not less attractive,
might be that children’s feelings about sweets in general are
almost always positive by nature. Thus, if they indeed reasoned
that the sweet with the modified description was the right choice
in the communicative context, this might have caused their
feelings about sweets to become even more positive.
If we assume that the younger children in our experiments
indeed derived an implicature when a redundant modifier was
used, it becomes particularly interesting to take a closer look
at the individual differences that we observed Experiment 2.
As depicted in Figure 6, the amount of variation between
the scores for the younger children was substantial: for a
minority of children, the difference between the scores in the
overspecification condition and the unmodified condition was
high, while for others it was non-existent. One interpretation
of this pattern would be that only the children with the higher
differential scores overgeneralized and derived an implicature,
while the children who scored zero (or even negatively) were
ahead in development and showed performance that was similar
to the children in the older age group. Another possibility would
be to explain the individual variation by means of a difference
in cognitive capacity, akin to a recent cognitive model proposed
by Hendriks (2016). In her model, Hendriks (2016) predicts that
at least some of the variation between language users during
reference production and comprehension should be explained by
differences in working memory capacity and processing speed.
Since working memory capacity and processing speed increase
through maturation and linguistic experience (Hendriks, 2016),
the children with low differential scores in Figure 6 may have had
insufficient cognitive resources available to derive an implicature,
unlike the children with a higher score. To find empirical support
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for one of these explanations, it would be relevant to replicate
the current study with even younger children, to see how they
perform in the tasks at hand.
An alternative and perhaps simpler explanation for the
observed age differences could be that the children did not even
wonder about a specific implicature that the speaker intended
to elicit, and that their preferences for sweets were determined
solely by attentional asymmetries. This explanation suggests that
the redundant modifier simply caused one sweet to be more
prominent than the other, but only for the younger children. The
effect of age group may in this scenario be due to a difference in
children’s attentional capacities. After all, at least in Experiment
1, the task required some attention switching between the two
sweets that were depicted in order to compare them. Given that
one of the sweets was described with a longer NP, it could be
that the younger children found it harder to switch their attention
back to the other sweet once it was attracted to the sweet with the
longer description. Related findings from the attention literature
confirm that the process of attention switching gets easier and
more flexible as children grow older (e.g., Hanania and Smith,
2010). However, it should be noted that attention switching was
not required in our second experiment, where every trial depicted
only one sweet. In future research, it would be thus interesting
to study the role of attention in more detail, for example by
replicating the first experiment in an eye-tracking paradigm. One
could then analyze the number of attention switches as a function
of age group. Hence, also measuring reaction times could serve to
distinguish between pragmatic and attention-based explanations.
Arguably, it may take some time to derive an implicature, so we
believe that longer reaction times for pictures where one sweet
is described with a redundant modifier would speak against the
attention-based explanation.
Another issue that we raised in the Introduction section
was related to the experimental task. Previous work found
that the task affects young children in the ability to derive
quantity implicatures. In particular, it was found that 5-year-
old children do not reject redundant (Davies and Katsos, 2010)
or underspecified (Katsos and Bishop, 2011) descriptions in a
binary judgment task, but that they tend to do so when graded
rating scales are used. In order to explain these differences,
Katsos and Bishop (2011) introduced the Pragmatic Tolerance
Hypothesis, which holds that certain tasks mask children’s actual
competence of the Gricean Maxim of Quantity. Katsos and
Bishop (2011) found evidence for this hypothesis by studying
children’s ability to master scalar quantifiers such as “some.”
However, it is interesting to speculate about the predictions of
Pragmatic Tolerance for the quantity implicatures studied here.
The most straightforward prediction of the Pragmatic
Tolerance Hypothesis for our experiments would be that
redundant modifiers guide 6- and 7-year-old children in their
preferences for sweets in Experiment 1 (where we used a forced-
choice task), but that this effect should disappear in Experiment
2 (where graded ratings were used). At first sight, our findings
speak against this prediction: the pattern that we observe in
the second experiment is similar to that in the first experiment.
However, a closer look at the effect sizes indicates that Pragmatic
Tolerance might still play a role, as the effects of redundancy were
less pronounced in the second rather than the first experiment.
This difference seems to be in favor of the Pragmatic Tolerance
Hypothesis: although the effects of redundancy did not disappear
in Experiment 2, the experimental task has caused the children to
be somewhat less tolerant toward overspecification there.
One final issue that we would like to discuss is whether
different kinds of redundant modifiers have different effects
on listeners. As described earlier, we manipulated both color
and shape information in the overspecification condition in
Experiment 1. Based on previous research with adult listeners,
one may expect to find an effect of modifier type there. For
example, an eye-tracking experiment conducted by Sedivy et al.
(1999) revealed that participants were quicker to comprehend
expressions such as Pick up the tall glass when another contrasting
object of the same category (e.g., a small glass) was present in
the context. However, for color attributes, a similar effect could
not be found (Sedivy, 2003), which suggests that redundant color
terms do not necessarily trigger contrastive inference. When
we look at the percentage scores for the older children in our
first experiment, we observe a pattern that seems to confirm
this suggestion: shape modifiers (56%), but not color modifiers
(49%), caused these children to have a slight preference for the
redundantly described sweets over the sweets that came with an
unmodified description. However, for the younger children, we
see the opposite pattern: at this age, color (83%) had a bigger
impact than shape (71%). Although we only used shape in two
trials, and color in four, these percentages again hint at some form
of development, as performance seems to become more adult-like
as children grow older.
CONCLUSION
In two experiments, we found that 6- and 7-year-old children are
guided by perceptual redundant modifiers when indicting their
preferences for sweets, while this was not the case for 9- and
10-year-old children. In particular, the younger children liked
a sweet that was redundantly referred to as, say, “green,” better
than the older children, irrespective of the task that was used to
study these preferences. We reason that between 6 and 10 years of
age, children learn that redundant modifiers are only sometimes
intended to elicit a specific conversational implicature.
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